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Abstract
Many pension funds have a mismatch between assets and liabilities, taking more risks than securing 
liabilities implies. This puts .xed claims of retirees at risk. For the cases with and without macro-risk, this 
paper analyses the implications of this asset-liability mismatch for welfare, contribution policy and pension 
fund governance. The ﬁ  rst result is that borrowing against human capital can be optimal if young work-
ers are borrowing constrained. However, then contributions need be raised in case of underfunding. This 
implies that the ex ante risk level cannot be separated from the contribution policy ex post. An optimal 
governance structure addresses this; otherwise a risk immunization policy -with the pension fund taking less 
risk- is second-best. 
In the presence of macro-risk it is not optimal to avoid losses for retirees. Optimal intergenerational risk 
sharing then implies retirees bear risks. The price and allocation of risk are determined endogenously with 
the result that losses are shared by higher contributions and lower pensions. This case applies in particular to 
large and nation-wide funds in a closed economies where the working participants coincide with tax-payers 
who underwrite “riskfree” government bonds.
Keywords: pension fund governance; leverage; macro risk.
JEL classiﬁ  cation: D74; G11; G23; G32.
Nederlandse samenvatting (Dutch summary)
Veel pensioenfondsen nemen meer risico dan nodig is om aan de verplichtingen te voldoen. Dit bete-
kent dat deelnemers met een gemaximaliseerde aanspraak op het fonds -slapers en gepensioneerden- een 
verhoogde kans lopen om bij onderdekking gekort te worden op die aanspraak. Omgekeerd hebben werk-
ende deelnemers en mogelijk de sponsor het voordeel dat zij de opbrengsten van het risicovolle beleid 
ontvangen in de vorm van premiekorting maar de verliezen deels kunnen afwentelen. Zo een zogenaamde 
“asset-liability mismatch” kan optimaal zijn, maar is dat onder een belangrijke voorwaarde. Bij onderdekking 
dienen de premies verhoogd te worden; premiebeleid en risicobeleid hangen op deze wijze nauw samen. 
Feitelijk lenen jongere van oudere deelnemers met menselijk kapitaal als onderpand. Indien dit niet mogelijk 
is omdat premies niet kunnen stijgen, dan is een alternatieve, sub-optimale oplossing om het risico te be-
perken.Page ● 8
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Deze resultaten gelden zowel in een situatie waarin het pensioenfonds klein is en geen invloed heeft op 
kapitaalmarkten als in de situatie waarin een groot pensioenfonds de prijzen beïnvloedt en er risico.s zijn op 
macroniveau die het fonds niet kan vermijden. Dit laatste geval onderscheidt zich wel in een ander opzicht. 
Het is dan niet optimaal dat gepensioneerden geen (macro)risico lopen; dat betekent namelijk dat actieve 
deelnemers inefﬁ  cient veel risico lopen. Het is dan optimaal dat het risico gedeeld wordt door een combina-
tie van hogere premies en lagere uitkeringen in geval van onderdekking.Page ● 9
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1. Introduction
Pension funds take risks. This may put .xed claims on the fund, typically held by retirees and deferred 
participants, at risk. The other way round, the claims of participants who are quasi-shareholders of the 
fund -generally the workers- increase in value. The latter can recoup gains in the form of lower pension 
contributions which is indeed the argument given by pension funds themselves to take risk. The pension 
fund effectively leverages investments of active participants. Retirees instead desire an investment strategy 
geared towards safeguarding liabilities by investing in .xed-security assets like bonds. The risky investments 
of pension funds thus lead to a conﬂ  ict of interest between retirees and workers, or more general between 
participants with .xed claims and participants who are quasi-shareholders.
This description of a¤airs is however incomplete from a macro perspective. Aggregate risks cannot 
be avoided and at a macro-level there is no such thing as a safe asset. When one party -the retirees- is fully 
sheltered from losses, it is ultimately another party -the workers- who takes on the risk. So when a pension 
fund buys “safe” bonds, it are the taxpayers -thus the workers- who underwrite the bonds and thereby take 
on macro-economic risks. The allocation of all macro-risks with one group -the workers- is inefﬁ  cient. And 
the larger the group that is sheltered from macro-risks becomes, the larger the problem becomes; this is 
precisely the consequence of aging. This may lead to a conﬂ  ict of interest between a group that is sheltered 
from all losses -the retirees- and a group that consequently bears all risks, the workers.
This study analyses the conﬂ  ict between young and old participants over the risk level in these two set-
tings. First, it considers the situation where a pension fund does not have any effect on capital markets. The 
capital market is exogenous to the fund that can thus buy safe assets and/or invest in risky assets as much 
as it wants without inﬂ  uencing prices.
The model formalizes that leverage can be welfare enhancing, as pension funds claim. The reason is that 
young workers are borrowing constrained. They want to invest borrowed money on the stock market. Pen-
sion funds can alleviate this constraint by facilitating that workers borrow from retirees. When this is done, 
young participants use human capital as collateral. Following Bodie et al. [1992], abundant human capital is 
the reason why young participants want to leverage up stock investment in the ﬁ  rst place. They can hedge 
their equity risk with their human capital. When capital market returns are depressed, contributions need be 
raised to secure claims of lenders. The borrowing facility thus comes with the caveat that the risk level ex 
ante cannot be separated from the contribution policy ex post. Good pension fund governance takes this 
into account and considers both simultaneously.Page ● 10
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This paper considers several ways to do so. Handing over control rights over the contribution level to 
retirees secures claims. This could be done by explicit board representation of retirees. This may however 
lead to another problem if the lending group (ab)uses this position to increase contributions beyond what 
is needed to repay. In that case control should not to be handed over totally and contributions need to be 
determined jointly. When retirees are not involved in determining contributions, another solution could 
be considered. Then the risk level could be scaled back to avoid losses for retirees. This risk immunization 
policy is sub optimal compared to joint control over contributions, but secures the claims of the lenders.
The second perspective is that of a large or national pension fund that cannot buy safe assets without 
inﬂ  uencing prices. Prices are endogenous, as taxpayers are increasingly unwilling to underwrite the bonds. 
As the tax-payers largely coincide with the working participants of the fund, the pension fund as a whole 
bears aggregate and unavoidable risks. In this case, it is not optimal to allocate all risks with one group, the 
workers. Instead it is best to share risks. Optimal risk sharing leads to a swap of risks between younger and 
older participants. The ﬁ  rst then disproportionally beneﬁ  t from a soaring economy whereas the latter suffer 
less from an economic downturn without being fully insured against it. Optimal risk sharing may still imply 
that the young borrow against human capital and similar problems as in the ﬁ  rst case arise.
An important implication is that retirees share in losses, although to a lesser extent than working genera-
tions. These results are derived under the assumption that all participants are fully aware of all risks. This 
in turn implies that pension funds communicate clearly about the risks participants face. Arguably this has 
seldom been the case.
Leverage is focal in understanding current losses of pension funds and the resulting conﬂ  icts between 
in particular younger and older participants. The OECD estimated that pension funds lost 3540 billion 
worldwide in 2008. The losses were concentrated with pension funds with high risk-exposure. On the other 
hand, pension funds that invested in “safe” government bonds are ultimately insured by the tax payer, that 
is the working generations.
This study relates to several streams of literature. First, there is an increasing literature on pension fund 
governance, see for example Besley and Prat [2003], van Ewijk [2009] and Lavigne and Nze-Obame [2010]. 
This literature focuses primarily on conﬂ  icts between participants and the sponsoring company; here the   
focus is on conﬂ  icting interests between participants instead. This applies to Collective Deﬁ  ned Contribu-
tion funds in which the sponsoring company pays contributions but does bear risk in case of underfunding. 
Second, the literature on optimal savings-consumption decisions over the life-cycle is important here, see Page ● 11
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Bovenberg et al. [2006] for an overview. This literature abstracts however from problems arising from collat-
eralisation of human capital. This paper addresses optimal consumption-savings decisions when collateral is 
not credible, making governance and regulation important.
Pension fund governance also resembles the conﬂ  ict between shareholders and debt holders, which 
involves the third relevant literature, see Jensen and Meckling [1976] and Sharpe [1976]. Shareholders reap 
the upside of large risks but can partly shift losses to bondholders in case of insolvency. The solution is 
that shareholders hand over control over insolvent company to creditors. This could be achieved by board 
representation of retirees.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the case without aggregate 
risk and also provides a numerical example. The third section considers the inclusion of macro-risk in the 
model and the last section concludes.Page ● 12
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2.  No Aggregate risk
The model considers a pension fund with mandatory participation. The pension fund consists of two 
groups that differ in one respect and one respect only, the size of human capital relative to ﬁ  nancial capital. 
The group with human capital is interpreted as workers. The group without human capital is interpreted as 
a group of retirees. This interpretation is not necessary but follows natural, as workers have more human 
capital than retirees.
The two groups may differ in size. The number of workers equals   and the number of retirees equals 





Human capital of workers equals H > 0 and it is risk free; their ﬁ  nancial capital is equal to  The retir-
ees have no human capital and ﬁ  nancial capital equals  > 0. The two groups thus have their own separate 
assets. The pension fund invests the assets on behalf of the participants without guaranteeing a minimal 
result. The pension arrangement is thereby Collective Deﬁ  ned Contribution where the sponsoring company 
bears no risk and all risks are borne by the collective of participants.
Individuals of both groups have a logarithmic utility function. Utility of workers and retirees is denoted 
by     1>4    respectively; 
  stands for consumption and equals human 
capital plus ﬁ  nancial capital.
2.1.  The capital market
The capital market consists of two assets. The ﬁ  rst asset is a risk-free bond with a return r. The second 
asset represents risky stock investment and is Bernouilli distributed. With a probability p the stock has a 
high return equal to  and with complementary probability    the return is  Stock return is the sole 
risk factor in this economy. The following relation holds: 


 . Unless stated otherwise the 
expected return of the stock exceeds the risk free return:     
  
2.2.  Workers borrowing constrained: leverage welfare 
enhancing
This section considers a situation where participants can borrow from each other; this is only relevant 
when one group prefers to borrow and the other group prefers to lend.Page ● 14
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The possibility that workers borrow outside the pension fund on ﬁ  nancial markets is ruled out. They 
are thus borrowing constrained. First, it is difﬁ  cult to borrow against (future) human capital. Second, most 
young people are not active on capital markets and it would come with high .xed costs to do so. Third, in-
surance companies are notoriously cost-inefﬁ  cient which generally offsets all investment gains; see Bikker 
and de Dreu [2009]. In choosing the optimal asset allocation, the workers face the following maximization 
problem where represents stock investment:
 
   
  
   












The equity premium is denoted by   Since the equity premium is strictly positive 
the stock allocation is strictly positive. The stock allocation can exceed one. In that case workers want to 
leverage their stock investment by investing borrowed money in the stock market.
Comparative statics indicate that the optimal equity allocation increases when human capital holdings 
increase and decreases if ﬁ  nancial capital increases.1 The intuition is that workers have implicit bond expo-
sure with their human capital, as both human capital and bonds are risk free. This in turn renders a higher 
stock fraction of ﬁ  nancial capital optimal.
The retirees essentially face the same maximization problem, though their human capital equals zero. 
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This indicates that 
  is always smaller than 






 The intuition is that the workers already (implicitly) hold a risk free asset 
with their wage, thereby increasing optimal equity exposure of their ﬁ  nancial capital.
Three possible conﬁ  gurations for the optimal asset allocation of old and young result. First, when 

    the workers can implement their preferred stock allocation; they don’t need to borrow. The same 







   both groups want to borrow to invest. The possibility to borrow 
outside the pension fund is ruled out and therefore neither of the two groups can implement its optimal 
investment. Instead both groups invest all assets in equity and     




  In this case retirees can implement their preferred stock allocation 
but the workers cannot. For that they need to borrow. The remainder of this section focuses on this case 
which is the most relevant as it captures the conﬂ  ict of interest that is currently present in many a pension 
fund.
Then the pension fund may be able to implement the optimal allocation for both groups. After all, the 
fund consists of a group -the workers- that wants to borrow and a group -the retirees- that wants to lend. 
The retirees are in principle indifferent whether they lend on an anonymous capital market or to the young. 
There is thus a gain from trade which the pension fund can exploit. The fund can do so in the following way.
The workers borrow 
    from the old, repaying 
   This is equivalent for the 
retirees and strictly improves welfare for the young vis-à-vis the situation where their stock allocation is 
restricted to    Alternatively but not assumed here the working participants could pay a (very) small 
premium above the risk free rate to persuade the retirees.




This condition states that the maximum amount the retirees are willing to lend is equal to or larger than 
the amount the workers want to borrow. Unless stated otherwise, this is assumed, considering that the old 
generally have (much) more ﬁ  nancial capital than young workers.










Note that a decrease of n -which can be interpreted as aging- leads to a lower risk level. This is indeed in 
line with empirical .ndings. Bikker et al. [2009] document that Dutch pension funds with older participants Page ● 16
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decrease their risk level. An increase in the average participants´ age of one year is associated with a decrease 
of half a percentage point of the stock exposure. Other studies ﬁ  nd this as well, see Alestalo and Puttonen 
[2006] and Gerber and Weber [2007] for analyses of Finnish and Swiss pension funds respectively.
2.3.  The consequences for contribution policy
With inter group lending, the workers borrow 
   from the old. When capital returns are high, 
the workers repay out of their ﬁ  nancial capital. When market returns are depressed, they need to repay 
(partly) with the human capital that served as collateral. In the context of pension funds, this implies higher   
pension contributions. Leverage thus results in a direct link between the risk level ex ante and the contribu-
tion policy ex post. 
Human capital serves as collateral when the following condition holds:

 	 
    
 	 






Paying back becomes more problematic if the risk free rate increases relative to there turn in the low-
state. The condition compares low return on workers´ ﬁ  nancial capital together with the borrowed amount 
with the gross risk free return on the borrowed amount. If the ﬁ  rst is smaller than the latter, human capital 
is needed to repay.
This could be hindered by pre-negotiated legal limits to contributions or by unwillingness of workers to 
pay higher contributions. The ﬁ  rst best allocation is then unfeasible. In the most extreme case, the workers 
do not use human capital. In that case the retirees receive 
 instead of 
   Consumption 







If workers do not use human capital to pay off their debt, they essentially have a form of limited li-
ability, similar to shareholders. Once all their ﬁ  nancial capital is lost when capital market is depressed, they 
do not face further losses irrespective of the size of the borrowed amount. Workers are quasi-shareholders 
who can reap all beneﬁ  ts but do not bear all losses. Retirees are quasi-bondholders with a .xed claim and 
downside risk.
This changes the decision problem of active participants as expected utility now becomes:

   
  

         Page ● 17
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Once        
  this pay-out function is strictly increasing in. From then 
on the workers will thus want to increase stock exposure as much as possible, the maximum borrowed 
amount equalling 
 This leads to a direct conﬂ  ict with retired participants, as for them unse-
cured lending comes down to expropriation. This again shows that investment decisions cannot be sepa-
rated from the contribution policy.
2.4.  Solutions for the hold-up problem
2.4.1.  Pension fund governance
The problem of borrowing against human capital resembles a hold-up problem. Workers want to lever-
age up stock investments, simultaneously promising to increase contributions in case of low stock return. 
However, when low returns materialize they have an incentive to break their promise. This commitment 
problem could be solved by voluntarily relinquishing their own power to resist higher contributions. In that 
case control over contributions is given to the retirees.
The following game formalizes this notion:
Step 1.  The workers decide whether to hand over control to determine contributions.
2.   The retirees decide how much to lend to working participants, in particular whether to accept 
  human capital as collateral. 
3.   Move by nature: stock returns are either high or low.
4a.   If returns are high, the workers pay back fully.
4b.   If returns are low, whoever is in control decides how much of human capital is used when neces-
 sary.
There are two cases to consider. First consider the case where retirees, when in control, exactly match 
contributions to what they are entitled to. When workers do not hand over control, retirees will not accept 
human capital as collateral; workers have an incentive to “default” on their “debt” in the case of low stock 
return. When the young do hand over control in step 1 and retirees accept human capital in step 2, an 
e¢fﬁ  cient equilibrium results. Then the retirees lend the optimal amount while being repaid fully. Given the 
strategy of the other group no group can do better.Page ● 18
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There are two other possible equilibria. Retirees restricting borrowing and the young not handing over 
control also constitutes a Nash equilibrium. And retirees restricting borrowing while the young do hand 
over control likewise constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
The latter is an equilibrium because retirees do not proﬁ  t from borrowing whatsoever. This would not 
be the case if the young (could) share their welfare gain by giving retirees a small but positive amount after 
they have accepted human capital as collateral.
Even then, there is no unique equilibrium as a strategy of the old to restrict borrowing and the strategy 
of the young to limit human capital transfers remains a Nash equilibrium also in that case. This underlines 
the importance to coordinate in the pension fund board on a Pareto efﬁ  cient equilibrium.
A second case arises when retirees (ab)use their control to transfer more than necessary, redistributing 
from workers to retirees via higher contributions. The commitment problem is then replaced by a dicta-
torship game where retirees are the ´dictator´ dictating their desired contribution level, which is as high as 
possible.
There is then a trade-off when handing over control over contribution policy. Too much control for 
retirees leads to excessive contributions whereas too much control for young leads to high leverage and 
unsecured lending. This suggests that in the presence of high leverage control over contributions has to 
be shared between workers and retirees. This could again be achieved by board representation of retirees.
2.4.2.  Risk immunization policy
A second solution to address too much leverage is limiting it. Borrowing of the young is restricted to   
the maximum that workers can repay with all their ﬁ  nancial capital and the borrowed money as collateral. 
This amount results from the following equation:
           


This is the maximum total amount that can be borrowed without human capital as collateral. The ex-
pression for B shows that the larger the ﬁ  nancial capital of the workers the more they can borrow, while a 
higher risk free rate or lower    decreases the maximum that can be borrowed.2 
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This is equal to the earlier found expression for which young start to borrow against human capital. 
When   	 
 the workers can only invest  instead of 
 When   
  the optimal stock expo-
sure can still be implemented and the workers choose the optimal exposure, 
. When leverage is limited 
the ﬁ  nal stock exposure thus equals  
. Again a feasibility condition is that the old are able to 
lend: 
      

When  	 
 which is the more interesting case from this papers´ perspective, the overall stock 








This again implies that the overall risk is decreased when there are relatively more retirees.
2.4.3. Numerical  example
This section provides a numerical example illustrating the model. The parameter values are given in the 
table below. The values are not calibrated and are used for illustrative purposes only. The ﬁ  rst graph depicts 
the optimal equity allocation for both groups as a function of the constant relative risk aversion. To con-
struct this graph a more general version of the model, including a CRRA-utility function, is considered3.If 
the constant relative risk aversion equals 1 the utility function reduces to logarithmic utility. Using the earlier 




1 > 4   C
  	  is smaller than 

 
  all borrowing transactions are feasible in this example.
The graph shows that the conﬂ  ict diminishes when risk aversion increases; if the young do not want to 
borrow, there is no conﬂ  ict anymore. Both groups can implement their optimal equity exposure.
3 With  






















This expression reduces to the logarithmic case if  Page ● 20
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The second graph shows the weighted sum of utility of the working and retired participants in three dif-
ferent cases. The ﬁ  rst case is the equity fraction that would result when human capital can serve as collateral, 
as described in section 2.2. The second case corresponds to restricted borrowing, as described in section 
2.4.2. The third case results when the equity exposure of section 2.2. is chosen ex ante but contributions are 
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For di¤erent values of   
 the expression     is given where   and  denote 
the utility of working and retired generation respectively in each scenario. Values of   and    
indicate that only utility of the young and the old respectively are considered. High leverage with limited 
liability is optimal for the young, but not for the old. The case with (credible) lending against human capital 
Pareto dominates the case when only ﬁ  nancial assets can be used as collateral.
The third graph shows pay-outs for the retired as a function of the actual stock return when workers 
have limited liability. As the stock is Bernouilli distributed only two values can in fact be realized and one 
outcome is realized. The optimal stock allocation is a function of these values which are 2 and 0.5 in the 
example.
The graph depicts the pay-outs for the resulting optimal stock allocation when the stock return takes on 
other values than 0.5 and 2. This disregards that in that case the optimal stock allocation itself would change.
Graph 3
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3.  Model with aggregate risk and optimal 
risk sharing
Thus far there was no macro-risk and the capital market was exogenous. In particular, the risk free asset 
was in limitless supply and with a constant price. This case is relevant for a small pension fund or a nation-
wide pension fund in a small open economy. For large pension funds or closed economies the assumption 
of a risk free asset is counterfactual. There exists considerable macro-risk and it has to be borne by some 
party. If one group owns “safe” assets, this means that some other party bears the risks. For a small pen-
sion fund this is not an important consideration. It can buy bonds without inﬂ  uencing its prices and with 
neglectable effects for tax-payers, who coincide with the participants. 
For a large pension fund this is not the case. Safeguarding one group -the retirees- means increasing 
risks for another group, the workers. Generally the resulting absence of risk sharing will not be optimal. 
This inefﬁ  ciency becomes more problematic when the risk bearing group decreases in size relative to the 
ﬁ  rst group and aging has exactly this effect. The following model considers the optimal risk sharing between 
older and younger participants in the presence of (unavoidable) aggregate risks. The pension fund as a 
whole faces macro-risk that it cannot avoid; the risks can only be allocated within the fund.
The result is again that borrowing against human capital can be optimal. This may therefore lead to the 
same type of problems as before. An important difference is that it is not optimal to shelter retirees from all 
risks. When the economy tumbles it is optimal ex ante that they also shoulder part of the losses.
3.1. The  model
The young again receive a .xed risk free wage per worker, denoted H. The .xed capital stock is denoted 
K and it is owned by the young and the old. The young have a claim equal to    and the old 
have a claim equal to    There are   workers and  retirees. The relative size of the younger 




 An individual worker thus receives  
	

  while an individual 
retiree receives  
	

  Total capital stock is Bernouilli distributed:
   G@ 
   G@   
The following relation holds: 
 Page ● 24
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Now deﬁ  ne   
	

  and    
	

   Further deﬁ  ne   
	





As the young hold a risk free quasi-asset with their human capital, they prefer to take on more risk than 
the elderly, exactly as in the previous section. Both generations can thereby gain from risk sharing. Opti-
mally, the young proﬁ  t disproportionally when the economy booms while the retirees are hurt relatively less 
when the economy tanks. The young and retirees can swap risks by trading between them the following as-
set, denoted Z. This asset pays out    in case     and pays out -1 in case    Demand by young 
and old for this asset depends on   , which follows from market clearing.
Demand by the young in turn results endogenously from maximizing utility: 
 
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Demand of the old likewise follows from optimising their utility:
 
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The market only clears when one group -the workers- is in demand for the asset Z, while the other 
group -retirees- is willing to supply the asset. The market for the asset Z clears if the price, implied by   , 
is such that demand by the young equals supply by the old. This market clearing return in the up-state,   , 
then follows from the condition 
  
 




If the young buy the asset, they pay Z per person to the old in case   , whereas the elderly pay   
  when the economy booms. Ex ante these transactions are strictly welfare improving vis-à-vis the situ-
ation without transactions. When H = 0, no transactions take place because both groups have exactly the 
same risk preferences. There is thus no    for which there is simultaneously positive supply and positive 
demand; either both groups have positive or both have negative demand for the asset.4 
4 When      
 
 	 	





  For this value of  
 demand and supply equals zero, that is: 	
  	
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The transactions can however lead to the same problems as before if the young cannot pay Z out of their 
ﬁ  nancial capital when called for. This is the case when 
  As an example, if      
and the condition would follow for any positive amount of Z. In this case, there is again a hold-up problem 
and the same two solutions -limiting risk or a change in the governance structure- can be considered.
The inclusion of aggregate risk indicates that from a macro-perspective buying a “safe” asset implies 
that another group faces more risks. This is generally not optimal and the corollary is that it is (ex ante) 
optimal that retirees share in the losses. This is in particular relevant for large pension funds which inﬂ  u-
ence capital markets and aggregate risk allocation with their ﬁ  nancial transaction. The model assumes that 
participants are fully aware and consent with the risks they bear. This awareness is not always present with 
retirees nor is this awareness promoted by all pension funds.Page ● 26
D.A. Hollanders & M. BersemPage ● 27
Pension fund governance
4. Conclusion
This paper focuses on the conﬂ  ict between young and retired generations that results from a risky in-
vestment policy. This conﬂ  ict can be witnessed in many pension funds nowadays. The central observation 
here is that risk-seeking pension funds may put claims of retirees at risk. This can be optimal when workers 
are borrowing contrained. However, then contributions need be raised when the risks turn bad. Workers 
however have an incentive to “default” ex post on their implicit obligation that results from ex ante optimal 
borrowing. The young then essentially face a hold-up problem. Optimal pension fund governance considers 
the risk level and contributions jointly.
This may be interpreted as a special application of Teulings and de Vries [2006] who argue that pension 
funds should exhibit cohort-speciﬁ  c investment. This study adds to their argument that borrowing between 
cohorts should be possible only when there is a securitized claim in the form of a credible contribution pol-
icy. Otherwise a risk immunization policy where risks are limited to secure assets of retirees is second-best.
The results apply irrespective of the presence of aggregate risks at the pension fund level. However, 
factoring in unavoidable macro-risks does change results in an important respect. It is then optimal that re-
tirees face risk ex ante and thus may have to take losses ex post. Optimal risk sharing entails that the working 
generations bear more but not all risks. When the economy tanks, losses are optimally shared by simultane-
ously increasing contributions and lowering pensions. In a meaningful discussion contribution policy, risk 
level and liabilities are considered jointly.Page ● 28
D.A. Hollanders & M. BersemPage ● 29
Pension fund governance
References
Alestalo, N. and V. Puttonen [2006], Asset allocation in Finnish pension funds, Journal of  Pension Economics 
and Finance 5, 27.44.
Besley, T. and A. Prat [2003], ´Pension Fund Governance and the Choice Between Deﬁ  ned Beneﬁ  t and 
Deﬁ  ned Contribution Plans´.
Bikker, J. A., D.W. Broeders, D.A. Hollanders and E.P. Ponds [2009], Pension funds.asset allocation and 
participant age: a test of the life cycle model, DNB working paper No. 223/October 2009.
Bikker, J.A. and J. de Dreu [2009], Operating costs of pension funds: the impact of scale, governance and 
plan design, Journal of  Pension Economics and Finance 8, 63-89.
Bodie, Z, R. C. Merton and W. F. Samuelson [1992], Labor supply ﬂ  exibility and portfolio choice in a life 
cycle model, Journal of  Economic Dynamics and Control 16, 427.449.
Bovenberg, L., R. Koijen, T. Nijman and C. Teulings [2007] ´Savings and Investing over the Life Cycle and 
the Role of Collective Pension Funds´, de Economist, 155(4), pp. 347-415.
Ewijk, C. van [2009] ´Credit Crisis and Dutch Pension Funds: Who Bears the Shock?´, de Economist, 157(3), 
pp. 337-351.
Gerber, D.S. and R. Weber [2007], Demography and investment behaviour of pension funds: evidence for 
Switzerland, Journal of  Pension Economics and Finance 6, 313.337
Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling [1976] ‘Theory of the ﬁ  rm: managerial behavior, agency costs and owner-
ship structure’, Journal of  Financial Economics, 3, pp. 305-360.
Lavigne, A. and J.H. Nze-Obame [2010] ‘Securing pension beneﬁ  ts in DB private schemes with priority 
rules: an insight from contracting theory’, Journal of  Pension Economics, 9(1), pp. 25-42.
Sharpe, W. F. [1976] ‘Corporate Pension Funding Policy’, Journal of  Financial Economics, 3, pp. 183-193.
Teulings, C. and C. de Vries [2006], ‘Generational Accounting, Solidarity and Pension Losses’, de Economist, 
146, pp. 63-83.Page ● 30
D.A. Hollanders & M. BersemPage ● 31
Pension fund governance
AIAS Working Papers (€ 7,50)
Recent publications of the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies. They can be downloaded 
from our website www.uva-aias.net under the subject Publications.
11-107  Codebook and explanatory note on the EurOccupations dataset about the job content of 
 150  occupations 
  2011 - Kea Tijdens, Esther de Ruijter and Judith de Ruijter
10-106  The Future of Employment Relations: Goodbye ‘Flexicurity’ – Welcome Back Transitional Labour  
 Markets? 
  2010 - Günther Schmid
10-105 Forthcoming:
  This time is different ?! The depth of the Financial Crisis and its effects in the Netherlands. 
  2010 - Wiemer Salverda
10-104 Forthcoming:
  Integrate to integrate. Explaining institutional change in the public employment service - the
  one shop ofﬁ  ce
  2010 - Marieke Beentjes, Jelle Visser and Marloes de Graaf-Zijl
10-103 Forthcoming:
  Separate, joint or integrated? Active labour market policy for unemployed on social assistance    
  and unemployment beneﬁ  ts
  2010 - Lucy Kok, Caroline Berden and Marloes de Graaf-Zijl
10-102  Codebook and explanatory note on the WageIndicator dataset a worldwide, continuous, 
  multilingual web-survey on work and wages with paper supplements
  2010 - Kea Tijdens, Sanne van Zijl, Melanie Hughie-Williams, Maarten van Klaveren, 
 Stephanie  Steinmetz
10-101  Uitkeringsgebruik van Migranten
  2010 - Aslan Zorlu, Joop Hartog and Marieke Beentjes
10-100  Low wages in the retail industry in the Netherlands. RSF project Future of work in Europe / 
  Low-wage Employment: Opportunity in the Workplace in Europe and the USA
  2010 - Maarten van Klaveren
10-99  Pension fund governance. The intergenerational conﬂ  ict over risk and contributions
  2010 - David Hollanders
10-98  The greying of the median voter. Aging and the politics of the welfare state in OECD 
 countries
  2010 - David Hollanders and Ferry Koster
10-97  An overview of women’s work and employment in Zimbabwe
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2010 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
10-96  An overview of women’s work and employment in Belarus
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2010 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
10-95  Uitzenden in tijden van crisis 
  2010 - Marloes de Graaf-Zijl and Emma FolmerPage ● 32
D.A. Hollanders & M. Bersem
10-94  An overview of women’s work and employment in Ukraine 
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2010 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
10-93  An overview of women’s work and employment in Kazakhstan
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2010 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
10-92  An overview of women’s work and employment in Azerbaijan
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2010 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
10-91  An overview of women’s work and employment in Indonesia
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2010 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
10-90  An overview of women’s work and employment in India
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2010 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
10-89  Coordination of national social security in the EU – Rules applicable in multiple cross border 
 situations
  2010 - Jan Cremers
10-88  Geïntegreerde dienstverlening in de keten van Werk en Inkomen
  2010 - Marloes de Graaf-Zijl, Marieke Beentjes, Eline van Braak
10-87  Emigration and labour shortages. An opportunity for trade unions in new member states?
  2010 - Monika Ewa Kaminska and Marta Kahancová
10-86  Measuring occupations in web-surveys. The WISCO database of occupations
  2010 - Kea Tijdens
09-85  Multinationals versus domestic ﬁ  rms: Wages, working hours and industrial relations
  2009 - Kea Tijdens and Maarten van Klaveren
09-84  Working time ﬂ  exibility components of companies in Europe
  2009 - Heejung Chung and Kea Tijdens
09-83  An overview of women’s work and employment in Brazil
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2009 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
09-82  An overview of women’s work and employment in Malawi
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2009 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
09-81  An overview of women’s work and employment in Botswana
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2009 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
09-80  An overview of women’s work and employment in Zambia
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2009 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
09-79  An overview of women’s work and employment in South Africa
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2009 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria RamosPage ● 33
Pension fund governance
09-78  An overview of women’s work and employment in Angola
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2009 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
09-77  An overview of women’s work and employment in Mozambique
  Decisions for Life Country Report
  2009 - Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams and Nuria Ramos
09-76  Comparing different weighting procedures for volunteer web surveys. Lessons to be learned from 
  German and Dutch Wage indicator data
  2009 - Stephanie Steinmetz, Kea Tijdens and Pablo de Pedraza
09-75  Welfare reform in the UK, the Netherlands, and Finland. Change within the limits of path 
 dependence.
  2009 - Minna van Gerven
09-74  Flexibility and security: an asymmetrical relationship? The uncertain relevance of ﬂ  exicurity policies 
  for segmented labour markets and residual welfare regimes
  2009 - Aliki Mouriki (guest at AIAS from October 2008 - March 2009)
09-73  Education, inequality, and active citizenship tensions in a differentiated schooling system
  2009 - Herman van de Werfhorst
09-72  An analysis of ﬁ   rm support for active labor market policies in Denmark, Germany, and the 
 Netherlands
  2009 - Moira Nelson 
08-71  The Dutch minimum wage radical reduction shifts main focus to part-time jobs 
  2008 - Wiemer Salverda
08-70  Parallelle innovatie als een vorm van beleidsleren: Het voorbeeld van de keten van werk en inkomen
  2008 - Marc van der Meer, Bert Roes
08-69  Balancing roles - bridging the divide between HRM, employee participation and learning in the Dutch 
 knowledge  economy
  2008 - Marc van der Meer, Wout Buitelaar
08-68  From policy to practice: Assessing sectoral ﬂ  exicurity in the Netherlands
  October 2008 - Hesther Houwing / Trudie Schils 
08-67  The ﬁ  rst part-time economy in the world. Does it work?
  Republication August 2008 - Jelle Visser
 
08-66  Gender equality in the Netherlands: an example of Europeanisation of social law and policy
  May 2008 - Nuria E.Ramos-Martin
07-65  Activating social policy and the preventive approach for the unemployed in the 
 Netherlands
  January 2008 - Minna van Gerven
07-64  Struggling for a proper job: Recent immigrants in the Netherlands
  January 2008 - Aslan Zorlu
07-63   Marktwerking en arbeidsvoorwaarden – de casus van het openbaar vervoer, de energiebedrijven en 
 de  thuiszorg
  July 2007 - Marc van der Meer, Marian Schaapman & Monique Aerts
07-62   Vocational education and active citizenship behaviour in cross-national perspective
  November 2007 - Herman G. van der WerfhorstPage ● 34
D.A. Hollanders & M. Bersem
07-61   The state in industrial relations: The politics of the minimum wage in Turkey and the USA
  November 2007 - Ruÿa Gökhan Koçer & Jelle Visser
07-60   Sample bias, weights and efﬁ  ciency of weights in a continuous web voluntary survey
  September 2007 - Pablo de Pedraza, Kea Tijdens & Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo
07-59  Globalization and working time: Work-Place hours and ﬂ  exibility in Germany
  October 2007 - Brian Burgoon & Damian Raess
07-58  Determinants of subjective job insecurity in 5 European countries
  August 2007 - Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo & Pablo de Pedraza
07-57  Does it matter who takes responsibility?
  May 2007 - Paul de Beer & Trudie Schils
07-56  Employement protection in dutch collective labour agreements
  April 2007 - Trudie Schils
07-54  Temporary agency work in the Netherlands
  February 2007 - Kea Tijdens, Maarten van Klaveren, Hester Houwing, Marc van der Meer &  
  Marieke van Essen
07-53  Distribution of responsibility for social security and labour market policy 
  Country report: Belgium
  January 2007 - Johan de Deken
07-52  Distribution of responsibility for social security and labour market policy
  Country report: Germany
  January 2007 - Bernard Ebbinghaus & Werner Eichhorst
07-51  Distribution of responsibility for social security and labour market policy 
  Country report: Denmark
  January 2007 - Per Kongshøj Madsen
07-50  Distribution of responsibility for social security and labour market policy 
  Country report: The United Kingdom 
  January 2007 - Jochen Clasen
07-49  Distribution of responsibility for social security and labour market policy  
  Country report: The Netherlands
  January 2007 - Trudie Schils
06-48  Population ageing in the Netherlands: demographic and ﬁ   nancial arguments for a balanced 
 approach
  January 2007 - Wiemer Salverda
06-47  The effects of social and political openness on the welfare state in 18 OECD countries, 
 1970-2000 
  January 2007 - Ferry Koster
06-46  Low pay incidence and mobility in the Netherlands - Exploring the role of personal, job 
  and employer characteristics
  October 2006 - Maite Blázques Cuesta & Wiemer Salverda
06-45   Diversity in work: The heterogeneity of women’s labour market participation patterns
  September 2006 - Mara Yerkes
06-44   Early retirement patterns in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
  October 2006 - Trudie SchilsPage ● 35
Pension fund governance
06-43  Women’s working preferences in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK 
  August 2006 - Mara Yerkes
05-42  Wage bargaining institutions in Europe: a happy marriage or preparing for divorce?
  December 2005 - Jelle Visser
05-41   The work-family balance on the union’s agenda
  December 2005 - Kilian Schreuder
05-40   Boxing and dancing: Dutch trade union and works council experiences revisited
  November 2005 - Maarten van Klaveren & Wim Sprenger
05-39   Analysing employment practices in western european multinationals: coordination, industrial 
  relations and employment ﬂ  exibility in Poland
  October 2005 - Marta Kahancova & Marc van der Meer
05-38  Income distribution in the Netherlands in the 20th century: long-run developments and 
 cyclical  properties
  September 2005 - Emiel Afman
05-37  Search, mismatch and unemployment
  July 2005 - Maite Blazques & Marcel Jansen
05-36  Women’s preferences or delineated policies? The development of part-time work in the 
  Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom
  July 2005 - Mara Yerkes & Jelle Visser
05-35  Vissen in een vreemde vijver: Het werven van verpleegkundigen en verzorgenden in het 
 buitenland
  May 2005 - Judith Roosblad
05-34  Female part-time employment in the Netherlands and Spain: an analysis of the reasons for taking a
  part-time job and of the major sectors in which these jobs are performed
  May 2005 - Elena Sirvent Garcia del Valle
05-33  Een functie met inhoud 2004 - Een enquête naar de taakinhoud van secretaressen 2004, 2000, 
 1994
  April 2005 - Kea Tijdens
04-32  Tax evasive behavior and gender in a transition country
  November 2004 - Klarita Gërxhani
04-31  How many hours do you usually work? An analysis of the working hours questions in 17 large-scale 
  surveys in 7 countries
  November 2004 - Kea Tijdens
04-30  Why do people work overtime hours? Paid and unpaid overtime working in the Netherlands
  August 2004 - Kea Tijdens
04-29  Overcoming marginalisation? Gender and ethnic segregation in the Dutch construction, health, 
  IT and printing industries 
  July 2004 - Marc van der Meer
04-28  The work-family balance in collective agreements. More female employees, more provi-
 sions?
  July 2004 - Killian Schreuder
04-27  Female income, the ego effect and the divorce decision: evidence from micro data
  March 2004 - Randy Kesselring (Professor of Economics at Arkansas State University, USA) was 
  guest at AIAS in April and May 2003Page ● 36
D.A. Hollanders & M. Bersem
04-26  Economische effecten van Immigratie – Ontwikkeling van een Databestand en eerste
 analyses
  Januari 2004 - Joop Hartog & Aslan Zorlu
03-25  Wage Indicator – Dataset Loonwijzer
  Januari 2004 - Kea Tijdens
03-24   Codeboek DUCADAM dataset
  December 2003 - Kilian Schreuder & Kea Tijdens
03-23  Household consumption and savings around the time of births and the role of education
  December 2003 - Adriaan S. Kalwij
03-22  A panel data analysis of the effects of wages, standard hours and unionisation on paid overtime 
  work in Britain
  October 2003 - Adriaan S. Kalwij
03-21  A two-step ﬁ  rst-difference estimator for a panel data tobit model
  December 2003 - Adriaan S. Kalwij
03-20  Individuals’ unemployment durations over the business cycle
  June 2003 - Adriaan Kalwei
03-19  Een onderzoek naar CAO-afspraken op basis van de FNV cao-databank en de AWVN-database
  December 2003 - Kea Tijdens & Maarten van Klaveren
03-18  Permanent and transitory wage inequality of British men, 1975-2001: Year, age and cohort 
 effects
  October 2003 - Adriaan S. Kalwij & Rob Alessie
03-17  Working women’s choices for domestic help
  October 2003 - Kea Tijdens, Tanja van der Lippe & Esther de Ruijter
03-16  De invloed van de Wet arbeid en zorg op verlofregelingen in CAO’s
  October 2003 - Marieke van Essen
03-15  Flexibility and social protection 
  August 2003 - Ton Wilthagen
03-14  Top incomes in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom over the Twentieth Century
  September 2003 - A.B.Atkinson & dr. W. Salverda
03-13  Tax evasion in Albania: An institutional vacuum 
  April 2003 - Klarita Gërxhani
03-12  Politico-economic institutions and the informal sector in Albania 
  May 2003 - Klarita Gërxhani
03-11  Tax evasion and the source of income: An experimental study in Albania and the Nether-
 lands 
  May 2003 - Klarita Gërxhani
03-10  Chances and limitations of “benchmarking” in the reform of welfare state structures - the case of 
 pension  policy
  May 2003 - Martin Schludi
03-09  Dealing with the “ﬂ  exibility-security-nexus: Institutions, strategies, opportunities and barriers
  May 2003 - Ton Wilthagen & Frank TrosPage ● 37
Pension fund governance
03-08   Tax evasion in transition: Outcome of an institutional clash -Testing Feige’s conjecture 
  March 2003 - Klarita Gërxhani
03-07  Teleworking policies of organisations- The Dutch experiencee 
  February 2003 - Kea Tijdens & Maarten van Klaveren
03-06  Flexible work - Arrangements and the quality of life 
  February 2003 - Cees Nierop
01-05  Employer’s and employees’ preferences for working time reduction and working time differentia-
  tion – A study of the 36 hours working week in the Dutch banking industry 
  2001 - Kea Tijdens
01-04  Pattern persistence in europan trade union density 
  October 2001 - Danielle Checchi & Jelle Visser
01-03  Negotiated ﬂ  exibility in working time and labour market transitions – The case of the 
 Netherlands
  2001 - Jelle Visser
01-02  Substitution or segregation: Explaining the gender composition in Dutch manufacturing industry 
  1899 – 1998 
  June 2001 - Maarten van Klaveren & Kea Tijdens
00-01  The ﬁ  rst part-time economy in the world. Does it work?
  2000 - Jelle VisserPage ● 38
D.A. Hollanders & M. BersemPage ● 39
Pension fund governance
Information about AIAS
AIAS is a young interdisciplinary institute, established in 1998, aiming to become the leading expert cen-
tre in the Netherlands for research on industrial relations, organisation of work, wage formation and labour 
market inequalities. As a network organisation, AIAS brings together high-level expertise at the University 
of Amsterdam from ﬁ  ve disciplines:
  ● Law
  ● Economics
  ● Sociology
  ● Psychology
  ● Health and safety studies
AIAS provides both teaching and research. On the teaching side it offers a Masters in Comparative 
Labour and Organisation Studies and one in Human Resource Management. In addition, it organizes spe-
cial courses in co-operation with other organisations such as the Netherlands Centre for Social Innovation 
(NCSI), the Netherlands Institute for Small and Medium-sized Companies (MKB-Nederland), the National 
Centre for Industrial Relations ‘De Burcht’, the National Institute for Co-determination (GBIO), and the 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. AIAS has an extensive research program 
(2004-2008) on Institutions, Inequalities and Internationalisation, building on the research performed by its 
member scholars. Current research themes effectively include:
  ● Wage formation, social policy and industrial relations
  ● The cycles of policy learning and mimicking in labour market reforms in Europe
  ● The distribution of responsibility between the state and the market in social security
  ● The wage-indicator and world-wide comparison of employment conditions
  ● The projects of the LoWER networkAmsterdam Institute for Advanced labour Studies
University of Amsterdam
Plantage Muidergracht 12  ●  1018 TV Amsterdam  ●  The Netherlands
Tel +31 20 525 4199  ●  Fax +31 20 525 4301
aias@uva.nl  ●  www.uva-aias.net